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I. CONTEXT 
 
This paper is a short account of the deep moral structures of 
Australian legal professions.  In attempting to understand 
how the ethics of any legal profession compare with those 
of other countries’ professions, the social, political and 
historical foundations of the profession help to explain the 
moral inclinations of individual lawyers and why they 
practise as they do.  For that reason, I concentrate on the 
political and philosophical liberalism that explains so much 
of Australian legal professions’ ethical structures.   
Specifically, I address two themes of a liberalism that 
informs the ethical dispositions of Australian lawyers – 
 Qualified partisanship (Part II); and 
 Moral neutrality (Part III).1         
 
I do not claim that these themes are unique to Australia.  
Indeed, one characteristic of Australian legal professions is 
their continuity with the legal professions of other common 
law countries.  And I do not suggest that these ethics are 
even unique to the common law.  The legal professions of 
the civil law world, in particular, also bear liberal 
influences, even if they are expressed differently.  But 
before any consideration is given to the liberal themes of 
Australian legal professions, their institutional context must 
be explained. 
 
1 Constitutional and legal framework    
Australia is a federation of six States,2 each of which was a 
self-governing colony in the British Empire before voting 
to establish, in 1901, a new nation as a self-governing 
dominion within the Empire.  The Founding Fathers were 
also enamoured of the American federal structure, and 
therefore entrusted the central ‘Commonwealth’ 
Government with only the limited powers necessary for the 
government of the nation as a whole, and left the balance of 
constitutional power to the States.  Australian legal 
professions are therefore State-based, and in the federal 
Territories they are also Territory-organised.3   
Control of the local profession therefore ultimately 
rests with the Supreme Court of the relevant State or 
                                       
1  Adapted from the two principles of ‘lawyer’s morality’ in David 
Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study (Princeton NJ, 1988) 7.  
See also Murray Schwartz, ‘The Professionalism and Accountability 
of Lawyers’ (1978) 66 California Law Review 669, 673. 
2  New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria 
and Western Australia.   
3  Ie, the two internal territories of the Australian Capital Territory 
(including the Jervis Bay Territory) and the Northern Territory.  The 
only inhabited external territory, Norfolk Island, has its own small 
legal profession. 
Territory, although to practise in federal courts a lawyer 
must separately enrol as a practitioner of the High Court of 
Australia.4  Each State and Territory can therefore structure 
and regulate its legal profession differently – in New South 
Wales (NSW), Queensland and Victoria the professions are 
divided into barristers’ and solicitors’ branches; in the 
smaller jurisdictions they are unified, although some 
lawyers might actually practise exclusively as barristers (at 
an ‘Independent Bar’).  In most States and Territories, there 
is a degree of external regulation by agencies appointed by 
the executive government.  In the Australian Capital 
Territory (ACT), South Australia and Tasmania, the 
professions are self-regulated by local Law Societies 
(lawyers’ professional guilds), though subject to the 
traditional supervision of the Supreme Court.5  
The position is complicated further by efforts since 
2009 to create one national legal profession.  There was 
already a generous scheme for lawyers to practise across 
State borders – a lawyer who is entitled to practise in any 
one State or Territory thereby gains a right of practice in all 
of the others.6  However, the large commercial firms 
lobbied to remove distinctive practice requirements for 
firms in each State and Territory, and pressed for one 
Australian legal profession to be regulated under one 
statute.  The lobbying was resisted by most State Law 
Societies, and the proposal failed completely in 2011 when 
most States concluded that a national scheme would add to 
the regulatory burden on lawyers and the cost of 
regulation.7  Still, an achievement of this process were 
revised codes of conduct: the Australian Barristers Conduct 
Rule, which was adopted in NSW, Queensland and 
Victoria; and the Australian Solicitors Conduct Rule was 
also adopted in the ACT and South Australia.  However, 
NSW and Victoria – where the large global and national 
law firms have more influence – tried to salvage the 
overarching regulatory legislation with their own two-State 
solution: the Legal Profession Uniform Law that was 
introduced in both States in 2015.  Western Australia has 
recently shown an interest in joining the Uniform Law, but 
no other State or Territory seems attracted to it. 
                                       
4  Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), ss 55A-55C. 
5  Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT), ss 35-71; Legal Practitioners Act 
1981 (SA), esp ss 16-20AK; Legal Profession Act 2007 (Tas); Legal 
Profession Regulations 2008 (Tas), r 4. 
6  James Jones, Anthony Davis, Simon Chester and Caroline Hart, 
‘Reforming Lawyer Mobility - Protecting Turf or Serving Clients? 
(2017) 30 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 125. 
7  Linda Haller, ‘When Shall the Twain Meet? Correspondent’s report 
from Australia’ (2011) 14(2) Legal Ethics 257; Reid Mortensen, ‘The 
Twain (and Only the Twain) Meet – the Demise of the Legal 
Profession National Law’, (2013) 16(1) Legal Ethics 219. 
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2 The colonial inheritance    
A second aspect of the context for Australian legal 
professions’ ethics is the extent to which the professions 
identify as progeny of theconfident English legal 
professions and, even compared with most other parts of 
the Commonwealth, retain the structures of the English 
professions in a conservative form.  This was not the British 
Government’s intention for any of its Australian colonies,8 
but in 1829 the NSW Supreme Court divided the local 
profession into barristers’ and solicitors’ branches.9  And 
reinforcing the Bar’s understanding of itself as inheriting 
British traditions, only barristers or advocates admitted as 
such in the United Kingdom could practise at the NSW Bar 
until the colony provided for its own barristers in 1848.10  
Divided professions were also inherited in Victoria and 
Queensland after they separated from NSW.  Despite 
government efforts in all three States to unify the 
profession, amalgamation has been resisted strongly and the 
divided professions are entrenched.  A divided profession, 
along with the preservation and development of the English 
moral traditions of both branches, does see different ethical 
dispositions arise between barristers and solicitors.  
Although they can be exaggerated, the distinctive ‘raiding’ 
and ‘trading’ ethics of barristers and solicitors not only 
reflect the different emphases of their work on, 
respectively, adversarial litigation and transactions, they 
also stem from the origins of each branch in lawyers who in 
medieval and early modern times often emerged from (for 
barristers) martial and gentrified classes and (for solicitors) 
a commercial class.11  
 Even if the distinctive traditions of barristers and 
solicitors are left to one side, lawyers across the English-
speaking world, including Australia, regularly appeal to the 
great moral claims of English lawyers of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, and which mark out legal professions 
that honed their ethics against the emerging liberalism of 
that period.  I also use those claims as reference points for 
the deep moral structures of Australian lawyers’ ethics. 
 
3 The adversary system   
An important colonial inheritance, and one shared with the 
whole common law world, is the adversary system of 
justice.  Popularly, though falsely, claimed to have 
originated in trial by battle, the adversary system is more 
properly understood as a distinctive English expression of 
liberalism.  In the eighteenth century, court procedure saw 
litigants themselves carrying greater responsibility for and 
control over litigation (with the responsibility for the claim 
and defence divided between the parties).  Litigants 
themselves collected the evidence that was needed to 
establish, or repel, a claim.  The judge and the jury 
developed a passive role in the process; being the decision-
makers, but entirely dependent on evidence mustered by the 
                                       
8  Third Charter of Justice 1823 (UK), cl 10; Australian Courts Act 1828 
(UK) (9 Geo 4 c. 83), s 2. 
9  Division of the Legal Profession Case [1829] NSWSC 34; Division of 
the Legal Profession Case [1831] NSWSC 5. 
10  Barristers Admission Act 1848 (NSW) (11 Vic No 57); Ex parte Digby 
(1877) 6 WN (NSW) 90; R v Stephen (1880) 1 NSWR 244. 
11  Jane Jacobs, Systems of Survival (New York, 1992); Mary Ann 
Glendon, A Nation Under Lawyers (New York, 1994) 60-84. 
parties and any legal arguments put to the court.  Party-
control of the conduct of litigation and prosecutions 
resonated with the individual freedom and responsibility of 
the litigant.  A passive judge exemplified the limited role 
that liberalism gave to government. 
 This remains the fundamental method of legal 
decision-making in the common law.   In the common law 
world, inquisitorial processes have been widely adopted 
over the twentieth- and twenty-first centuries through the 
growth of investigative commissions and mixed judicial-
administrative tribunals.  Through the development of case 
management in the regular courts,12 judges are more 
actively involved in the conduct of litigation.  These 
developments, however, have not shifted the lawyer’s 
principal responsibility in litigation and prosecutions for 
evidence-collection, strategy and case development; nor the 
ethics that respond to this role.  Party-control of legal 
proceedings is assumed, as is the lawyer as the professional 
agent for that.   
The way that the adversary system of justice 
mediates liberalism into lawyers’ ethics has been subject to 
longstanding and influential scholarly criticism.  David 
Luban, in particular, questions the moral foundation of the 
adversary system itself (though accepting Enlightenment 
liberalism) and, so, the moral ground of any scheme of 
lawyers’ ethics that rests on it.13  In an earlier critique, 
Richard Wasserstrom was concerned what the adversary 
system did to the personal morals of lawyers themselves; 
making them ‘competitive rather than cooperative, 
aggressive rather than accommodating, pragmatic rather 
than principled, and ruthless rather than compassionate’.14  
This happens, although it is perhaps not an inevitable moral 
outcome for a liberal legal profession.  
   
II. QUALIFIED PARTISANSHIP 
 
The lawyer’s partisan representation of her client is the 
professional expression of liberalism’s radical elevation of 
the individual citizen, and the citizen’s right to explore all 
of the moral choices that are available to him within the 
bounds of the law.  Lawyering is the agency of the 
autonomous citizen, so the lawyer’s role is to push the 
client’s interests to the fullest extent that is legally 
permissible.15 
 The theme of partisanship is powerfully 
expressed in a lawyer’s legal obligations to act single-
mindedly in the client’s interests.  In Anglo-Australian 
law, it is best represented by the lawyer’s fiduciary 
obligations to the client.16  These obligations emerged 
from equitable ideas of conscience, and also demand 
that, when representing her client, a lawyer not be 
distracted by duties owed to other clients or her own 
                                       
12  Ashmore v Corporation of Lloyd's [1992] 1 WLR 446. 
13  Luban, above n 1, 50-103; David Luban, ‘Twenty Theses on 
Adversarial Ethics’ in Helen Stacy and Michael Lavarch (eds), Beyond 
the Adversarial System (Sydney, 1999) 134-54. 
14  Richard Wasserstrom, ‘Lawyers as Professionals:  Some Moral Issues’ 
(1975) 5 Human Rights 1. 
15  Cf Schwartz, above n 1, 673. 
16  Andy Boon and Jennifer Lavin, The Ethics and Conduct of Lawyers in 
England and Wales (2nd ed, Oxford, 2008) 197.  
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personal interests.  A lawyer cannot act when there is a 
‘conflict’ – whether of duties owed to different clients, 
or with the lawyer’s own personal interest.17  This may 
also be one area where, in recent years, solicitors’ 
‘trading’ and commercial inclinations have created some 
ethical tension with this theme of single-minded 
partisanship.  Through the 2010s, Australia’s largest 
commercial firms pushed strenuously for a change to 
these conflict rules to allow solicitors’ practices to act 
simultaneously for clients’ with conflicting interests – 
even when the clients were unaware of the conflict.  This 
lobbying, mainly directed at the Law Council of 
Australia’s development of the Australian Solicitors 
Conduct Rules, was ultimately unsuccessful – probably 
because it challenged deep-seated professional 
understanding of the solicitor’s role.  It may nevertheless 
represent a shift, at least by some lawyers in global or 
national commercial practices, from an understanding of 
legal practice as a fiduciary commitment to the interests 
of an individual client towards a more general 
marketplace business ethic.   
How extreme the partisanship of the common 
lawyer must be, though, remains to be resolved.  
Throughout the common law world, Henry Brougham’s 
declaration in 1820 that an advocate ‘knows in the 
discharge of that office but one person in the world, that 
client and no other’18 is the principal reference for this 
debate.19  Brougham’s claim is taken to support zealous 
partisanship, because he continued that the advocate 
‘must not regard the alarm, the suffering, the torment, 
the destruction which he will bring upon any other’.20 
Luban’s critique of the widespread support for 
zealous partisanship led him to develop a modified 
partisanship, by which this kind of zeal would be 
expected of lawyers in criminal defence but, in civil 
litigation and transactional work, a lawyer’s partisanship 
would not allow her to cause harm to innocent third 
parties, manipulate the letter of the law beyond its spirit, 
or cause a substantive injustice (whatever that may 
mean).21  Common examples of the difference are the 
treatment of witnesses and, in civil litigation, the 
pleading of a limitation period to defeat what are 
otherwise substantiated claims.22  Zealously partisan 
lawyers representing the Catholic Church in NSW were 
comprehensively criticised for opting to cross-examine a 
plaintiff-witness in an historic child sex abuse case; a 
cross-examination that took four days and gave rise to 
‘extreme distress’ for an already vulnerable witness.23   
 I prefer the term qualified partisanship as an 
account of this theme of Australian legal professions’ 
                                       
17  See also Australian Barristers Conduct Rules, rr 118-20; Australian 
Solicitors Conduct Rules, rr 10-12. 
18  The Queen’s Trial (1820) 1 St Tr (NS) 1348.  
19  For Australia, see Christine Parker and Adrian Evans, Inside Lawyers’ 
Ethics (3rd ed, Melbourne, 2018) 30. 
20  The Queen’s Trial (1820) 1 St Tr (NS) 1348.  
21  Luban, above n 1, 157.  
22  Ibid, 9-10.  
23  Tony Foley, ‘Institutional Responses to Child Sex Abuse: How a 
Moral Conversation with its Layers Might Contribute to Cultural 
Change in a Faith-Based Institution’ (2015) 18(2) Legal Ethics 164. 
deep moral structures.  As is the case with common 
lawyers across the world, all Australian lawyers are 
officers of the Supreme Court that admitted them.24  
Australian courts have repeatedly emphasised the 
constraints that this status places on the lawyer’s duty to 
the client, and therefore its qualification of their 
partisanship.  Chief Justice Mason’s statement in 
Giannarelli v Wraith is now the standard expression of 
this qualification.  
 
The duty to the court is paramount and must be 
performed, even if the client gives instructions to the 
contrary … [A] barrister's duty to the court epitomizes the 
fact that the course of litigation depends on the exercise 
by counsel of an independent discretion or judgment in 
the conduct and management of a case in which he has an 
eye, not only to his client's success, but also to the speedy 
and efficient administration of justice.25 
 
The Chief Justice clearly contradicted Brougham’s claim 
that an advocate should disregard all but the client’s 
interests, and recognised an element of ethical constraint 
on the pursuit of client interests.  Although the constraint 
is recognised in other common law countries,26 
American observers have noted Australian lawyers’ 
heightened awareness (relative to American lawyers’ 
awareness) of their status as officers of the court, and 
that it has some effect on how they conduct advocacy.27  
The latter point may be debatable, but it at least suggests 
a broad ethical awareness of the line between the duties 
to the court and the interests of the client that justifies 
the description of a qualified partisanship. 
 Just where the line between duties to the court 
and the client is drawn is not easily understood,28 and 
again is conditioned by the needs of the adversarial 
system of justice.  This is particularly marked with duties 
of confidentiality, where the law of client privilege links 
the close-to-absolute secrecy that a lawyer must maintain 
for client communications to the needs of adversarial 
litigation.29  The need for the client to be confident that a 
lawyer will not disclose his secrets, no matter how 
appalling, is thought necessary for the client to be 
completely candid with the lawyer and the lawyer’s case 
preparation; and so for the administration of adversarial 
justice.  It is tied, once again, to party-control of 
litigation.  The general public may not understand why a 
lawyer who has received client’s confession of guilt is, 
without the client’s consent, prohibited by law from 
telling the court of that guilt30 – or even from telling the 
authorities that an innocent person might be suffering 
punishment for the offence that the client committed.31  
                                       
24  Eg, see Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW & Vic), s 25. 
25  (1988) 165 CLR 543, 555-6.           
26  Rondel v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191, 227.           
27  Abbe Smith, ‘Defending the Unpopular Down-Under’ (2006) 30(2) 
Melbourne University Law Review 495.  
28  Cf Giannarelli v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543, 555-6.           
29  Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 74; Attorney-General (NT) v 
Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475, 480. 
30  Tuckiar v R (1934) 52 CLR 335. 
31  Carter v Managing Partner, Northmore, Hale, Davy and Leake (1995) 
183 CLR 121. 
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Here, the rationale that seems to justify an individual 
injustice is the lawyer’s duty to the system of justice – 
specifically an adversary system of justice at that.32  
 It is unsurprising, given the difficulty of 
knowing where partisanship ends and the prior duty the 
court takes over, that the professional codes are 
preoccupied with the question.  The Australian 
Barristers Conduct Rules and the Australian Solicitors 
Conduct Rules detail when confidences must be kept or 
may be disclosed;33 when documents must be handed 
back to a client or competing lawyer for litigation or a 
prosecution;34 that courts and other lawyers must not be 
misled and mistakes made in comments to a court or 
another lawyer must be corrected;35 that precedents that 
are unhelpful to the client’s case must nevertheless be 
brought to the court’s attention;36 that a lawyer must 
withdraw if she is aware of a client’s perjury;37 that a 
lawyer who is aware of a client’s guilt cannot present an 
alibi or any defence inconsistent with the client’s 
confession;38 when a client’s intention to disobey a court 
order must or must not be disclosed to the court;39 that 
allegations made about another person are supported by 
evidence;40 that witnesses are not to be suborned or 
coached;41 and that unfair advantage may not be taken of 
another lawyer’s mistake (including where she has 
accidentally received an opponent’s confidential 
material).42  The partisanship of lawyers who represent 
the Crown in criminal prosecutions is even more 
constrained, and prosecutors are required ‘not to press … 
for a conviction beyond a full and firm presentation of 
that case’.43  The citizen therefore has a greater formal 
entitlement to a partisan lawyer than the government has.  
  
 
 
                                       
32  There are surprisingly few disciplinary where lawyers have broken 
confidentiality, but see Legal Complaints Committee v Trowell [2009] 
WASAT 42; Legal Services Commissioner v Tampoe [2009] QLPT 
14. 
33  Australian Barristers Conduct Rules, rr 114-18; Australian Solicitors 
Conduct Rules, r 9. 
34  Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules, r 15. 
35  Australian Barristers Conduct Rules, rr 24-5, 49-50; Australian 
Solicitors Conduct Rules, rr 19.1-19.2, 22.1-22.2. 
36  Australian Barristers Conduct Rules, r 29; Australian Solicitors 
Conduct Rules, r 19.6. 
37  Australian Barristers Conduct Rules, r 79; Australian Solicitors 
Conduct Rules, r 20.1. 
38  Australian Barristers Conduct Rules, r 80; Australian Solicitors 
Conduct Rules, r 20.2. 
39  Australian Barristers Conduct Rules, r 81; Australian Solicitors 
Conduct Rules, r 20.3. 
40  Australian Barristers Conduct Rules, rr 64-8; Australian Solicitors 
Conduct Rules, r 21. 
41  Australian Barristers Conduct Rules, r 69; Australian Solicitors 
Conduct Rules, r 24. 
42  Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules, rr 30, 31; eg Expense Reduction 
Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and 
Marketing Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 46; Katie Murray, ‘Acting on 
Opponents’ Mistakes - Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v 
Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd and the 
Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Material’ (2014) 17(1) Legal 
Ethics 132 
43  Australian Barristers Conduct Rules, r 84; Australian Solicitors 
Conduct Rules, r 29.2. 
III.  MORAL NEUTRALITY 
 
The second theme of moral neutrality is deeply embedded 
in the expectations of the common lawyers’ role.44  It 
seems paradoxical that moral neutrality would be 
considered part of the deep morality of the legal profession, 
but in this connection it represents the thin procedural 
morality45 that recognises the citizen’s rights to give effect 
to his own reasonable life plans.  It is therefore only the 
law itself that places limits on the lawyer’s societal 
obligation to accept instructions from a potential client.  
Nothing else (except maybe a fee) determines whether the 
lawyer should take and complete any work requested by the 
potential client.  The corollary is that the lawyer carries no 
moral responsibility for the outcome of the lawyer’s work.  
This theme of moral neutrality arises because any question 
of the substantive justice or moral worth of the legal work 
is regarded as irrelevant to the principal decision by which 
the lawyer accepts a client and his cause.  This surrendering 
of the lawyer’s moral judgment to the client’s and the 
abdication of moral responsibility are certainly vexed, and 
they lie behind the criticism that a lawyer will do anything 
for fee.  Even the liberal Thomas Macaulay questioned how 
‘it be right that a man should, with a wig on his head and a 
band round his neck, do for a guinea what, without these 
appendages, he would think it wicked and infamous to do 
for an empire’.46  Anthony Trollope presented the ethic as 
identical with that of an assassin’s: the client outlines what 
he wants done, and lawyer and assassin alike are the tools 
by which it is achieved.47  These, of course, are hyperbole, 
but there is little doubt that lawyers will appeal to an ethic 
of moral neutrality to deflect criticism of the client they 
represent or the cause they pursue for him.  As US 
Supreme Court Justice Fortas said:  
Lawyers are agents, not principals; and they 
should neither criticize nor tolerate criticism 
based upon the character of the client whom they 
represent …48   
 
This is a long distance from the common lawyer’s 
medieval antecedents who, while usually expected to 
represent any comer, were taken to have committed ‘a 
grave sin’ if knowingly taking up an unjust cause.49  The 
ethic of moral neutrality, though, as it has developed since 
the eighteenth century, is deeply ingrained in the modern 
                                       
44  Aspects of Part III reprise ideas in Reid Mortensen, ‘Agency, 
Autonomy and a Theology of Legal Practice (2002) 14 Bond Law 
Review 391. 
45  John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, 1972) 395-9.   
46  Thomas Babington Macaulay (Lord Macaulay), ‘Lord Bacon’ in 
Thomas Babington Macaulay (Lord Macaulay), Critical and 
Historical Essays Contributed to the Edinburgh Review (5th ed, 
London, 1848) II, 318. 
47  Anthony Trollope, Orley Farm (Oxford, 1985) 359.     
48  Cited in Thomas Shaffer, On Being a Christian and a Lawyer (Provo, 
Utah, 1981) 7. 
49  Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (London, 1975) XXXVIII, 151; 
M Harding, ‘True Justice in Courts of Law’ in Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa Theologica (New York, 1948) III, 3345, 3355-6.  See also 
Brennan J’s references in Gianarelli v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543, 
580.   
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lawyer’s role – although it is generally not reflected in 
written obligations in any professional code. 
The one exception to that is the ‘cab rank rule’ 
that applies to barristers in the English tradition and that, as 
a result, is a prominent professional rule in the Australian 
States that maintain divided professions and Independent 
Bars.  The rule requires a barrister to accept any brief 
offered by a solicitor as long as it is within the barrister’s 
skill and expertise and (again) a reasonable fee is offered.50  
The barrister is just ‘a cab-for-hire’.  Lord Hobhouse 
believed that this rule was ‘a fundamental and essential part 
of a liberal legal system’.51  The thinking behind that can 
be traced to the eighteenth century, when it was recognised 
that a lawyer who tried to screen a client or cause on the 
ground of its justice or morality was assuming the role of a 
judge.52  The best-known instance where an Australian 
lawyer, qua lawyer, gave expression to the ethic of moral 
neutrality despite his personal and political commitments 
was HV Evatt’s representation of the Waterside Workers’ 
Federation in the 1951 constitutional challenge to the 
Federal Parliament’s attempt to ban the Communist Party 
of Australia and dissolve communist trade unions 
(including the Waterside Workers).  Dr Evatt had been a 
Justice of the High Court of Australia, but retired from the 
Court in 1940 to enter federal politics.  By 1950, he was 
Deputy Leader of the Australian Labor Party Opposition, 
and was struggling with communist infiltration of the ALP 
and public perception that it was sympathetic to 
communism.  Evatt himself had been urging that the ALP 
distance itself from communists.  He nevertheless accepted 
the brief to appear for the Waterside Workers.  The rest of 
the ALP leadership was horrified: ‘What you are proposing 
is ethically correct, professionally sound, and politically 
very, very foolish’.53  Evatt nevertheless appeared before 
the High Court for the union, and successfully argued that 
the Communist Party Dissolution Act was invalid.54   
There is no doubt that the cab-rank rule is easily 
escaped – a brief can be refused because of ‘personal 
engagements’.55  It does not apply to solicitors, yet it only 
applies to barristers when they are briefed by solicitors.56  
The rule does not formally guarantee anyone access to the 
best advocate.57  Its real significance is probably symbolic, 
                                       
50  See Legal Profession Uniform Conduct (Barristers) Rules 2015, r 17: 
 A barrister must accept a brief from a solicitor to appear before a court 
in a field in which the barrister practises or professes to practise if: 
(a)   the brief is within the barrister's capacity, skill and experience; 
(b)  the barrister would be available to work as a barrister when the 
brief would require the barrister to appear or to prepare …; 
(c)   the fee offered on the brief is acceptable to the barrister; and 
(d)  the barrister is not obliged or permitted to refuse the brief under 
rules 101, 103, 104 or 105. 
51  Arthur JS Hall & Co (a firm) v Simons [2000] 3 WLR 543, 610. 
52  See the comments of Samuel Johnson in 1773: James Boswell, The 
Journal of the Tour to the Hebrides (London, 1985) 168-9; and 
Thomas Erskine in R v Thomas Paine (1792) 22 St Tr 357, 412. 
53  Kylie Tennant, Evatt: Politics and Justice (Sydney, 1970) 262.  
54  Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1. The 
political damage to the ALP was severe. 
55  Legal Profession Uniform Conduct (Barristers) Rules 2015, r 105(b). 
56  Barristers may accept a brief directly from a client, although it is 
uncommon: Legal Profession Uniform Conduct (Barristers) Rules 
2015, rr 21-1. 
57  For a sceptical account of the rule, see HHA Cooper, ‘Representation 
of the Unpopular’ (1974) 22 Chitty’s Law Journal 333. 
as it is consistently presented as a central institution of 
common law justice.58  There is little doubt that its greatest 
importance lies in criminal defence, where public 
understanding of the defendant’s rights to due process of 
law may be weak, and defence lawyers are often subject to 
moral opprobrium for representing the ‘obviously guilty’.  
In defence, the cab-rank lawyer can plead that she has no 
choice.  And, here, the cab-rank rule’s use as a reference 
point for the theme of moral neutrality in the legal 
profession’s ethics may well see it have even a broader 
effect than a code applicable only to barristers would have.  
In an empirical study of Victorian lawyers, Abbe Smith 
noted the role that the cab-rank rule had in obligating 
lawyers to take on unpopular clients – and found that even 
solicitors (to whom the rule does not apply) were often 
morally motivated by cab-rank principles.  She also found 
that, while there were naturally exceptions, the Victorian 
lawyers were generally prepared to take unpopular clients 
and represent them – even as zealous partisans.  It was not 
that there were political or ideological reasons for 
accepting the client.  Smith concluded that the lawyers 
were motivated ‘more by a sense of professional duty than 
by a desire to help clients’.59  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Australian lawyers easily wear the description, coined by 
Alasdair MacIntyre, that western lawyers are ‘the clergy of 
liberalism’.60   The deep moral structures of legal 
professions have emerged over the last two or three 
centuries in response to the profound social and economic 
changes of the modern era.  However, as MacIntyre’s 
description suggests, the practising legal profession has 
itself also been a critical means by which the legal system 
has given effect to the Enlightenment’s elevation of the 
individual.    
 In many respects, the theme of moral neutrality is 
the most striking expression of the thin, rights-based 
morality that coordinates liberal societies.  It is not without 
its philosophical difficulties61 – especially in its refusal to 
take any moral responsibility for the outcomes of a 
lawyer’s work.62  The increasing specialisation of law firms 
and, since the 1970s, the rise of cause lawyering have seen 
large sectors of Australian legal professions screen the 
representation of clients by criteria other than their legal 
entitlements.  They often share their clients’ values or 
political commitments and, contrary to moral neutrality, 
take moral credit for achieving (what they consider are) 
substantively just outcomes.  Global and national 
commercial firms, and specialist personal injuries, family 
law, conveyancing, intellectual property and criminal 
defence practices, inevitably develop a clientele of a 
distinct social profile.  Trade unions instruct a small group 
                                       
58  Eg, see Rondel v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191, 227; Giannarelli v Wraith 
(1988) 165 CLR 543, 580; Arthur JS Hall & Co (a firm) v Simons 
[2000] 3 WLR 543, 550, 558, 585, 610. 
59  Smith, above n 27. 
60  Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice, Which Rationality? (South Bend, 
Ind, 1988) 344. 
61  Mortensen, above n 44, 394-403. 
62  See above nn 44-49, and accompanying text. 
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of firms that specialise in industrial claims, personal 
injuries litigation and class actions.  There is a burgeoning 
publicly- or community-funded sector of legal services 
committed exclusively to representing Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Australians, women, migrant groups, 
refugees, environmental groups or, above all, the 
impecunious.  Although the Independent Bar and 
(especially in regional Australia) general legal practices 
still tend toward an ethic of taking all comers, it must be 
questioned whether, in the specialist and cause-oriented 
profession, individual lawyers are committed to an ethic of 
moral neutrality.  It may not matter, as long as moral 
neutrality holds in the important and ethically distinctive 
area of criminal defence, where it is tied closely to the 
defendant’s rights of due process.  In civil legal practice, 
the extensive and highly pluralised market for legal 
services inevitably means there is still a lawyer who will 
help the citizen achieve his life plans.  The individual 
lawyer may now often put her own moral cast on the legal 
work she takes, but Australian legal professions show all 
signs of deepening their place as a ‘clergy of liberalism’. 
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